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ABSTRACT:  
   The science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke wrote, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic.”[1] While not magical by any means, the technology used to 
detect gravitational waves starting in 2015 is surely sufficiently advanced to be remarkable by 
any ordinary standard. That technology was developed over a period of almost six decades; the 
people who were directly involved numbered in the thousands. In this article, I give an 
idiosyncratic account of the history, with a focus on the question of how people learned what 
measurement technology would be “sufficiently advanced” to succeed in detecting gravitational 
waves. 
 
The start of the search for gravitational waves 
   Although the existence of gravitational waves was predicted by Einstein early in his 
development of the General Theory of Relativity,[2] Einstein himself never proposed that 
anyone search for gravitational waves. This contrasts with his well-known respect for 
experimental tests of his theory. He himself was immensely gratified that General Relativity 
explained the previously-measured precession of the perihelion of Mercury. The experimental 
confirmation in 1919 [3] of GR’s prediction of the bending of starlight by the Sun made Einstein 
an international celebrity. The third of his three “classic tests”, the gravitational redshift, was 
only successfully carried out in 1960. [4]  
   The reason for Einstein’s silence on gravitational wave detection isn’t known, but that is 
because there are too many reasons for it! No physical system, whether pre-existing in Nature 
nor purpose-built in the laboratory, could make a signal strong enough to be detected by any 
measuring apparatus conceivable in the early 20th century. (In his 1916 paper, Einstein remarks 
that the weakness of gravitational effects makes it difficult to conceive of a detectable 
gravitational wave.) Simply put, there was no prospect of any sufficiently advanced technology 
for the purpose. 
   But as if that weren’t enough, Einstein also had serious doubts about the validity of his own 
prediction that gravitational waves existed. The mathematics of gauge freedom in General 
Relativity was slippery enough that the theory’s inventor didn’t see how to be certain that there 
was some gauge-invariant reality to the waves. 
   For these good reasons, there was no effort to search for gravitational waves for the first four 
decades after their prediction. When gravitational waves were discussed at all, it was in the 
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context of trying to ascertain, by theoretical means, whether General Relativity predicted them or 
not. 
   All of this changed during the course of a single talk at the first-ever international conference 
on General Relativity. The Conference on the Role of Gravitation in Physics, held at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on 18 – 23 January 1957, brought together 44 of the 
world’s leading physicists who were working on problems related to General Relativity. While 
many of them arrived unconvinced of the reality of gravitational waves, a new consensus was 
established by the talk given by Felix Pirani, “Measurement of Classical Gravitation Fields.” In 
it, Pirani gave a simple argument that made clear that something measurable happened when a 
gravitational wave passed through a set of free masses – there was an easy-to-calculate 
unambiguous change in the separations between the masses. Thus, at a stroke Pirani resolved 
Einstein’s (and his successors’) worries about whether there was anything coordinate-
independent about gravitational waves; there was. (The history of this whole controversy is 
beautifully covered in Dan Kennefick’s book, Traveling at the Speed of Thought.[5] For more on 
Pirani’s central role, see [6].) 
   Pirani’s talk was in the great Einsteinian tradition of resolving a conceptual question by 
proposing a thought experiment. What is remarkable about this thought experiment is that it led 
immediately to activity to realize it as an actual experiment. Joseph Weber was at the Chapel Hill 
Conference, in the company of his mentor John Archibald Wheeler. Weber must have been 
struck particularly by the exchange between Pirani and Hermann Bondi, during which Pirani said 
that the separation change between two test masses could be measured by sensing the stretching 
of a spring that connected them. By the time the Conference had ended, Weber had told the 
Conference’s sponsor (Josh Goldberg, in his role with the U.S. Air Force) that he intended to 
follow up on Pirani’s breakthrough. [7] Sure enough, within a few months a paper appeared by 
Weber and Wheeler, [8] recapping Pirani’s argument (with suitable attribution), and explaining 
that one could in fact build a gravitational wave detector that implemented his idea. Over several 
years, Weber submitted essays to the Gravity Research Foundation essay competition, winning 
third prize in 1958, and first prize in 1959. The latter essay was also published in the Physical 
Review, [9] and constituted the manifesto of the research program that Weber pursued from that 
point forward, establishing the field of gravitational wave detection. Within about a decade, 
Weber was reporting that his detectors were finding evidence that gravitational waves were 
indeed being measured. [10] 
   There are many remarkable things about this story: the direct line (of almost zero length!) 
between the description of a thought experiment and the start of work to implement it, the (as it 
turned out) mistaken claims to have found signals, the world-wide effort to check Weber’s 
discovery leading to its debunking, and the persistence (over decades!) of efforts to accomplish 
Weber’s goal that finally led in 2015 to the genuine detection of gravitational waves and their 
establishment as a new means of doing gravitational physics and astronomy. 
   For the purposes of the present review, though, I’d like to highlight another seldom-remarked-
upon aspect of the story. That is the fact that, when Weber embarked on his quest, he never 
seems to have asked the question about what sensitivity would be required to find naturally-
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occurring gravitational wave signals. He made the immediate leap from Pirani’s demonstration 
of in-principle possibility to the campaign to realize that possibility. Decades before the film 
Field of Dreams, Weber bet his career on the maxim, “If you build it, they will come.” [11] 
   Looking back over what it actually took to develop the “sufficiently advanced technology” (a 
team of scientists and engineers counted in the thousands, working for decades, using funds 
measured in units of hundreds of millions of dollars or Euros), Weber’s confidence seems 
incredible. But before we call it madness, consider that his first detectors cost only a few tens of 
thousands of dollars, and could be built by a single principal investigator working with the help 
of only a few graduate students. Recall also that Weber was working when astronomy was being 
blown wide open by the creation of new observing modalities: radio astronomy was the most 
vivid example that would have inspired Weber in 1957, but through the course of Weber’s 
development work in the 1960’s, X-ray astronomy and infrared astronomy achieved major (and 
surprising!) discoveries. Why shouldn’t he have been optimistic? 
   But while Weber was able to ignore the question at the start of his efforts, the issue was 
impossible to ignore once he started to report evidence for his reception of frequent gravitational 
wave burst signals. The situation can be understood by examining the 1972 review article 
“Gravitational-wave astronomy” by Press and Thorne. [12] The Introduction section contains the 
remarkable admission that, “We (the authors) find Weber’s experimental evidence for 
gravitational waves fairly convincing. But we also recognize that there are as yet no plausible 
theoretical explanations of the waves’ source and observed strength. Thus, we feel that we must 
protect this review against being made irrelevant by a possible ‘disproof’ of Weber’s results.” 
(I’d imagine that the authors soon wished that they could retract the “scare quotes” around the 
word “disproof.”) 
   When discussing Weber’s experiment specifically, Press and Thorne report that although it 
seemed just barely possible that a single one of Weber’s bursts might have come “from a ‘strong’ 
supernova or stellar collapse somewhere in our Galaxy,” they go on to note that “the number of 
bursts observed is at least 1000 times greater than current astrophysical ideas predict!” The next 
sentence, enumerating a rather desperate list of sources that might explain the apparent signals, 
ends with three question marks, followed by the statement that, “In fact, one is offered the 
tantalizing possibility that these new phenomena might dominate all other forms of energy 
generation and might force a major restructuring of our understanding of galactic and 
cosmological evolution.” 
   Fortunately for physics and for standards of punctuation, the situation was soon resolved. 
Between 1972 and 1974, results came in from a number of experiments that had been undertaken 
to check Weber’s results. [13] None of them found anything like Weber’s results. (There was a 
single never-explained burst seen in coincidence between two bars operated by the Glasgow 
group. [14]) The Weber-induced frenzy was resolved by a conclusion (never shared by Weber!) 
that Weber’s “events” were not genuine gravitational waves.  
   But the solution to one problem immediately led to a new problem: Should the search for 
gravitational waves continue, and if so, what level of sensitivity would be “sufficiently 
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advanced” to allow success? Alongside these questions was another one: Would detectors of 
Weber’s type (resonant cylinders with frequencies near 1 kHz and lengths of order 1 meter) 
constitute sufficiently advanced technology, or was altogether new technology required? 
   As with any difficult question, here different answers were given by different players. People 
moved forward from the Weber debacle in two main directions. A large portion of the 
community remained committed to Weber-style resonant-mass detectors, but aimed at a dramatic 
improvement in sensitivity through the use of cryogenic techniques. Another portion of the 
community (including many newcomers) embarked in a dramatically different direction – they 
aimed at much larger detectors (eventually several km in scale), with (effectively) free masses 
whose relative motions were sensed by tricked-up Michelson interferometers. 
   The subsequent decades of history tell us which idea was the one that eventually succeeded. 
But it is important to realize that the correct choice was far from clear in 1974. I want to describe 
each choice based on what was known, or could have been known, at the time. The question was, 
of course, what would constitute “sufficiently advanced technology” to enable the detection of 
gravitational wave signals. (A stimulating examination of this history can be found in Gravity’s 
Shadow by Harry Collins.[15]) 
 
The case for cryogenic bars 
   It may seem strange to talk about technological conservatism in a field as ambitious as 
gravitational wave detection; and yet it made some real sense for people to stick with a 
technology that they understood. Of course, there had to be reason for optimism that sensitivity 
would improve substantially in a next generation instrument; after all, the community had just 
failed to see anything in their attempt to confirm Weber’s claim. 
   Cryogenics held out the promise of the required big jump in sensitivity. Several factors 
combined in a virtuous way to give reasons for optimism. Recall that a resonant bar responded to 
a brief impulse by being set into vibration at its fundamental normal mode near 1 kHz. In order 
to be detected, that vibration has to stand out against the noise in the amplifier that senses the 
electrical signal generated by the transducer used to sense the vibration. It also needs to be 
stronger than the natural background of vibration of the mode due to Brownian motion. At low 
temperatures, very low noise amplifiers based on Superconducting Quantum Interference 
Devices (or SQUIDs) provide a much lower readout noise for small signals to compete against. 
Materials for the bar itself can have much higher quality factors (Aluminum 5056 alloy has a Q 
approaching 108 at 50 mK),[16] allowing longer time averaging to further reduce the influence of 
amplifier noise. Finally, the lower temperature gives a direct reduction in Brownian motion 
noise, which is proportional to kBT. One could expect that the noise could be brought down to an 
rms level equivalent to a strain of h ~ 10-18, a full two orders of magnitude improvement in 
amplitude sensitivity beyond the best room temperature technology. 
   But would that be enough to meet the standard of “sufficiently advanced technology”? That 
depended on what signals were provided by the Universe. With a brand new observing modality, 
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one could always be hopeful that there were heretofore unsuspected phenomena just faint enough 
not to have been discovered yet. The example of Galileo’s new astronomy was often used --  
Galileo was the first to turn a telescope toward the sky, and he was immediately rewarded with 
the discovery of sunspots, the moons of Jupiter, the phases of Venus, and the faint stars that 
make up the Milky Way. Could it not be the case that gravitational waves were like that? Weber 
had certainly seemed to think so. And perhaps he’d been just a bit unlucky in the level of 
sensitivity that he had reached. 
   On the other hand, it would have been much more of a sure bet if the new generation of 
detectors were aimed at a source that was known to send to the detectors frequent signals of 
sufficient strength to be found. In the 1970’s, this kind of hope focused on gravitational wave 
bursts generated by gravitational collapse of the core of a massive star, the event that initiates 
one of the main kinds of supernova. The supernova rate was relatively well known, of order 1 
(perhaps a few) per 100 years per galaxy like the Milky Way. 
   It was the strength of signals from supernovae that was hard to predict. At the upper end of 
optimistic predictions in the late 1970’s, it was thought that perhaps they might generate a brief 
signal with an amplitude of about 10-18 at frequencies near the ~ 1 kHz resonant frequencies of 
bars, if the supernova occurred within our own Milky Way Galaxy. [17] So, optimism for this 
generation of detectors rested on a) achieving the new sensitivity target for cryogenic 
technology, b) supernovae being as “luminous” in gravitational waves as seemed at all possible, 
and c) an observing program that might need to last decades in order to catch one “golden” 
detectable event. This was a long shot if ever there was one, but at least it was something. 
 
The case for interferometers 
   The idea of searching for gravitational waves with interferometers occurred to several groups 
of people independently. The first published proposal to use interferometers came from two 
Russian physicists, Gertsenshtein and Pustovoit.[18] The first interferometer to be built (on 
table-top scale) was by Weber’s former student Robert Forward,[19] who had discussed the idea 
with Weber while they were still working together. But the most careful study of how 
interferometers might revolutionize the search for gravitational waves came from Rai Weiss, 
who in 1972 published (albeit only in an internal progress report of MIT’s Research Laboratory 
of Electronics) a remarkable prospectus for the field.[20] 
   Weiss brought many key qualities to this task. A former grad student of Jerrold Zacharias and a 
former postdoc of Robert Dicke, he was looking for ways to apply precision measurement 
technology to problems in gravitational physics; he had also worked on developing early laser 
technology with Shaoul Ezekiel. Like many others, Weiss was intrigued by Weber’s claims to 
have detected gravitational waves. Unlike others, he was interested in immediately leapfrogging 
to dramatically improved sensitivity, and thought that large (km-scale) interferometers were the 
appropriate technology for that purpose. 
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   Weiss’s reading of Weber’s papers led him to the published papers of Felix Pirani. In the 
article in Acta Physica Polonica, [21] unlike in Pirani’s talk at Chapel Hill, Weiss read that 
Pirani described his thought experiment not as masses that might be connected by a spring, but 
instead as spatially separated masses whose separations could be monitored by measuring the 
round-trip time of light signals that traveled between them. Weiss recognized that a Michelson 
interferometer performed just such a travel time measurement, actually a comparison of two 
round-trip travel times on perpendicular paths. This was a) perfectly suited for the quadrupolar 
strain pattern of gravitational waves and b) embodied the principles of differential measurements 
of which Dicke was so fond.[22] (In this case, the balanced instrument geometry nulled out what 
would otherwise be a large noise term, fluctuations in the laser light’s frequency.)  
   Of course, unlike Michelson’s interferometer, one that was aimed at detecting gravitational 
waves would need the mirrors to be more-or-less free, not bolted down. This called for an 
elaborate feedback control system, more grist for the mill of techniques from the school of 
Dicke. 
   By 1972, with Weber’s claims attracting attention everywhere, Weiss wrote his prospectus for 
a future program of interferometric gravitational wave detectors. In it, he was agnostic on the 
validity of Weber’s claims. Intriguingly, Weiss took as his target source the steady nearly-
sinusoidal gravitational waves emitted by the Crab Pulsar (if it is sufficiently far from 
axisymmetric.) Note, though, that since the Crab Pulsar’s eccentricity wasn’t known (and still 
isn’t, beyond some ever-improving upper limits [23]), Weiss could not use it for the purpose of 
establishing the sensitivity that would be required of an interferometric gravitational wave 
detector. 
   Weiss pointed out that size really matters in gravitational wave detectors. Because the wave’s 
effect on a set of test particles is to apply a (quadrupolar) strain, the actually separation change 
between any pair of test masses is proportional to their separation. Resonant detectors have their 
lengths determined by the need for their fundamental resonant frequency (the inverse of the 
round-trip sound travel time between the ends of the detector) to lie in a band containing 
substantial power from the wave itself; given the speed of sound in materials and the estimated 
signal frequency of about 1 kHz, that led directly to the size of order one meter that was 
characteristic of Weber’s detectors and all that were developed subsequently. Interferometers had 
the promise to benefit from much larger separations, until the round trip light travel time 
becomes comparable to the signal period. The fact that the speed of light is so much greater than 
the speed of sound in materials thus shows that interferometers have a natural advantage of many 
orders of magnitude. 
   Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Weiss’s 1972 paper is the extensive and detailed 
analysis of the noise budget of an interferometer. Workers in the field today are still astounded at 
how large a fraction of the essential difficulties were understood already at the start by Weiss. 
This analysis confirmed “from the bottom up” Weiss’s top-down argument that large 
interferometers would have an advantage over Weber-style detectors in direct proportion to the 
ratio of lengths. Almost every term in the noise budget (as given in units of displacement) had a 
strength that was independent of length, so that the signal to noise ratio (to a signal whose 
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strength was characterized by a dimensionless strain) improved with length. (The only exception 
was Newtonian gravitational noise from density fluctuations in the environment, and then only in 
the low frequency limit where seismic/acoustic wavelengths are long compared to the size of the 
detector. But this noise source is only strong at frequencies around or below 10 Hz, and fell 
steeply at higher frequencies.) 
   We can mention a frequency of 10 Hz in this context because, unlike Weber-style resonant 
detectors, interferometric detectors are in principle (and in fact) capable of broad-band operation, 
where the output of the instrument gives a faithful readout of the strain waveform h(t) of the 
incident gravitational wave. Weber-style detectors use the high-Q resonance to boost signal 
strength above the sensor noise in the displacement readout, by averaging for a long time. But, to 
the extent that the test masses in an interferometer are more-or-less free, the bet could be made 
that displacement readout noise (in this case, shot noise in the laser light) is small enough that 
one can sample the strain output many thousands of times per second.  
   The actual useful bandwidth of an interferometer is determined by a few factors.  
• The “free” test masses aren’t truly free, but are masses suspended as pendulums with a 
resonant frequency of about 1 Hz. Thus, performance will be limited for frequencies near 
1 Hz and below. 
• Several noise terms (including Newtonian gravitational noise, the (usually) much 
stronger direct seismic noise coupling, as well as other technical effects) tend to be much 
stronger at low frequencies than at high frequencies. Thus, the noise budget tends to have 
a “wall” preventing operation at or below frequencies of order 10 Hz. 
• There’s a gradual roll-off of sensitivity at high frequencies, from the competition between 
frequency-independent shot noise and the frequency-dependent strain sensitivity.  
Still, history has since shown that useful observations can be obtained over a broad band between 
~ 10 Hz and a few kilohertz, with the possibility of searching for a wide range of gravitational 
wave signals and also with faithful reproduction of the signals’ waveforms once they are found. 
   Compared with all of these “on paper” benefits, it was clear even in 1972 that there was a pair 
of daunting drawbacks. Everyone who read Weiss’s prospectus could see that what he was 
proposing was both awesomely complex and much more expensive than Weber-style detectors. 
Both of these drawbacks proved to be correct descriptions of the detectors that succeeded 
decades later.   
 
Taking stock at the Battelle Conference, 1978 
   Key members of the gravitational wave detection community gathered in late summer of 1978 
at the Battelle Seattle Research Center to consider the state of the field, in a workshop called 
Sources of Gravitational Radiation.[24] Notable especially was the focus on trying to establish 
believable estimates of the strengths of signals that would be presented to the next generation of 
detectors. The workshop was bookended by two discussion sessions, the first on the current state 
of detection technologies and on their prospects, and the second devoted to comparing likely 
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instrumental sensitivities with the strengths of predicted signals. The published proceedings of 
the workshop include transcripts of comments made in the discussion sessions, thus allowing 
deep insight into the state of the field. During the discussion session on detectors, Robert 
Forward is quoted as saying, “At least we are now able to draw the antenna sensitivity curves 
and the source [strength] curves on the same graph. Surely [laughter and applause] this means we 
have come a long way.”[25] 
   That quote indicates that the field had matured quite a bit in the previous decade. Recall that 
the 1972 review article by Press and Thorne contained a wild mix of sober and highly 
speculative ideas for gravitational wave signal strengths, motivated by the then-still-live 
possibility that Weber’s events were real. By 1978, participants knew that Weber’s “events” 
could be disregarded, and wanted only sober assessments of what they needed to be looking for.  
   Just as Pirani’s talk at the Chapel Hill Conference of 1957 resolved theoretical questions about 
the physical reality of gravitational waves, there was a talk at the Battelle Workshop of 1978 that 
resolved questions about what would be the most-likely-to-be-detected source of gravitational 
waves. But unlike the case Pirani’s 1957 talk, which instantaneously convinced everyone who 
heard it that it was a “game changer”, the talk given by J. Paul A. Clark only gradually came to 
be recognized as the essential contribution that it was.[26] Clark had been a graduate student of 
Douglas Eardley at Yale, where the two of them wrote one of the early papers describing the 
gravitational wave signal from the inspiral and coalescence of a neutron star binary. [27] That 
paper concluded that signals from binary coalescences would be “less important than supernovae 
as sources of gravitational waves.” However, by the time of the Battelle Workshop, Clark had 
realized that that conclusion was both premature and unduly pessimistic. Firstly, it now looked as 
if the abundance of neutron star binaries was much higher than he had previously believed (by 
nearly two orders of magnitude.) Secondly, the previous comparison with supernovae had 
assumed that supernovae were efficient sources of gravitational waves, but that was coming to 
seem less certain. The resulting conclusion was that, unless supernovae were indeed as efficient 
as anyone had thought to be at all plausible, neutron star binaries would more important sources 
of gravitational waves. (Oh and, by the way, something similar was true for mixed neutron 
star/black hole binaries as well!) 
   Perhaps the impact of this paper was blunted by Clark’s choice to present this news in terms of 
a comparison with the more-uncertain-by-the-day supernova signals. But gradually, readers came 
to understand that Clark’s conclusion was even more important if expressed without any 
reference to supernova signals. What he had shown was that: 
• neutron star binaries were efficient sources of gravitational waves whose waveforms 
(including their strengths) could be calculated directly from general relativity, 
• the abundances of neutron star binaries were reasonably well established, leading to 
rather secure predictions of the amplitudes of signals that would arrive at gravitational 
wave detectors at any given detection rate (say, once per year), 
• the waveforms of compact binary signals was such that it would be much more favorable 
to search for them with broadband detectors sensitive below 1 kHz than it would be to 
use resonant detectors sensitive just at 1 kHz, and 
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• the peak amplitude of the likely once/year signal was unfortunately somewhat below 
h ~ 10-21, more probably h ~ 10-22. 
As this news was digested by the gravitational wave community, its impact became clear. If one 
wanted to be sure to have designed a “sufficiently advanced” detector, the target source was now 
known: neutron star binaries (or their close cousins involving black holes.) 
   The impact of Clark’s talk (which, like Pirani’s work decades earlier, had been submitted to a 
regular journal for publication prior to his delivery of the talk [28]) was different on the resonant 
detector community than it was on the nascent group of people developing interferometers. For 
the resonant detectors, Clark’s signal wasn’t all that well suited. Thus, their target source 
continued to be a supernova in our Galaxy, hoping that it was as strong as it could possibly be, 
and also hoping that one didn’t have to wait 50 years for one to go off. For interferometers, the 
source seemed almost tailor-made. But on that word “almost”, a tale hangs, as I’ll describe 
below.  
 
The “Blue Book” design study of large interferometers 
   For too many of us (at least in the American context), there’s a reflex to think of government as 
at best a non-creative influence and at worst as something that actively interferes with creativity. 
Nothing could do more to counter such attitudes than to study the role of the U.S. National 
Science Foundation in fostering the discovery of gravitational waves. 
   If there is a single hero to this part of the story, it is the physicist Richard Isaacson (although he 
in turn is quick to credit his mentor at the NSF, Marcel Bardon.) Isaacson, a gifted relativist in 
his own right,[29] served as the NSF’s Program Officer in Gravitational Physics from 1973 to 
2002. His energetic and insightful leadership, out of public view but very much visible to 
members of the community that he nurtured and supported over three decades, is as responsible 
as any other individual’s contribution for the success of gravitational wave detection. 
   When Isaacson first took on leadership of NSF’s portfolio of gravitational wave research, the 
search for gravitational waves was at a fever pitch of excitement and turmoil. The attempted 
replications of Weber’s claims was beginning to coalesce in the community’s rejection of those 
claims. The question of what should come next was on everyone’s mind, as we saw above. 
Isaacson was determined to do what he could to support that community and to ensure that it 
carried out the best science possible. 
   For the portion of the community focusing on resonant detectors, Isaacson offered substantial 
support for the development of the new generation of cryogenic detectors. He also insisted that 
the community bring the development work to fruition as soon as was practicable, and that it 
resist the seduction of “sweet” technology in favor of a focus on actually searching for 
gravitational waves. By the time of the 1978 Battelle workshop, several groups’ detectors were 
almost ready to turn on. The start of the 1980’s saw the publication of the first observations; for 
the rest of the ‘80’s and ‘90’s, Isaacson helped to ensure a healthy program of instrument 
development and observation. Quietly (and for the most part behind the scenes), he also insisted 
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that the scientific standards of the groups’ observations be the highest possible; blind analysis 
was required, and the continued evidence of the rejection of Weber’s never-surrendered claims 
was highlighted at every opportunity. 
   For those who were just beginning the development of interferometric detectors, Isaacson 
necessarily offered a different kind of support. He saw clearly that interferometric technology 
had great promise but that it was far from ready to implement. In part, the lack of readiness was 
strictly technical: no one had operated an interferometer at anywhere close to the sensitivity that 
would be required. But just as important in Isaacson’s mind was the lack of a community ready 
to design, engineer, build, commission, and operate a highly complex detector, far larger in scale 
and budget than anything that the gravitational wave community had ever done (or even than 
NSF had ever supported!) 
   Under the leadership of Kip Thorne, Caltech made a major commitment (supported by 
Isaacson at NSF) to develop interferometric gravitational wave detectors, and in 1979 succeeded 
in recruiting Ronald Drever from Glasgow to lead the experimental effort. The highlight of the 
investment there was the construction of a prototype interferometer with arms 40 meters in 
length. 
   Isaacson carried out a different sort of community building with Weiss at MIT; there, NSF 
funded a proposal to carry out a design study that examined whether it would indeed be possible 
to scale up an interferometer from the small prototypes then in existence to the multi-km scale at 
which the technology would fulfill its scientific promise. [Personal note: The grant included 
funds for a postdoc to support the design study, who turned out to be me, in my first job after 
earning my Ph.D.] Isaacson saw, before anyone else, that it would be just as important to present 
competent engineering as to present a strong science case or convincing laboratory-scale 
technology demonstrations, if the large interferometers were going to receive the substantial 
funding that would be required. Thus, NSF’s grant to MIT explicitly called for working with 
industrial engineering firms to validate that, say, the huge vacuum system could be constructed 
successfully and operated for a reasonable amount of money. 
   No other form of gravitational wave detector showed any believable chance of reaching the 
level of sensitivity that would be required to detect the strongest guaranteed source, Clark’s 
neutron star binaries. But could interferometers in real life fulfill their on-paper promise to meet 
of sensitivity to strains of 10-21 or smaller? Isaacson’s challenge to the Caltech and MIT groups 
was nothing less than to demonstrate that “sufficiently advanced technology” could truly be 
developed for the task of detecting gravitational waves. 
   The MIT design study (which came to be known as the “Blue Book” because of the color of 
the covers used when it was presented to the NSF) was completed in October 1983 (with a 
contribution also from Stan Whitcomb at Caltech.)[30] It reported that the engineering 
requirements of large interferometers could indeed be met, for a then-considered-large cost of 
order $100 M (still substantially below what turned out to be the true cost.) The document 
reviewed the likely sources of signals, with content similar to that of the Battelle Workshop 
proceedings; the “guaranteed” signal comes from neutron star binaries. The crucial sentence is, 
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“To see around 10 events per year we must see to distance of 150 Mpc, where maximum 
amplitudes are around h=10-22.” 
   The section of the report describing expected instrumental performance was remarkably 
optimistic. Based on several aggressive assumptions about what might be feasible 
• 100 W of laser power,  
• active seismic isolation, and  
• arm cavity storage time optimized at each frequency (which could have made sense if 
described as the result of the use of Fabry-Perot cavities in the arms, even though that 
was not specifically mentioned), 
the report predicted a noise spectrum remarkably close to that of the Advanced LIGO 
instruments on 14 September 2015. There was also another slightly less optimistic noise 
spectrum for arms with fixed storage time of 1 ms, corresponding to arms containing Herriott 
delay lines, the favorite design of the MIT authors. 
   The Blue Book was presented late in 1983, jointly by Weiss’s MIT research group and 
Drever’s Caltech research group, to the NSF’s Advisory Committee for Physics. It was received 
respectfully, giving Isaacson the endorsement he needed to keep funding the development of 
interferometers. 
 
Brief apology to the reader 
   For the history narrated to this point, I believe that I’ve covered the highlights of the field 
without regard to where the events took place. The subsequent history is more complicated, and 
took place in multiple parallel tracks (primarily) in the U.S. and in a number of European 
countries. The author knows the U.S. history fairly well, but is not capable of doing justice fully 
to the parallel developments in Europe. Thus, in the remainder of this review, events in the U.S. 
will be featured, with (unfortunately) only brief mentions of the similar progress taking place 
elsewhere. A future review by a more knowledgeable person will be needed to fill in the portions 
of the history that this review is unable to cover. 
 
LIGO’s 1989 construction proposal 
   Over the next half-decade, the Caltech and MIT groups struggled in their respective 
laboratories with prototype interferometers, and struggled with each other to invent a plan that 
could be formally proposed for construction. (Its name was also coined, as the Laser 
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, or LIGO.) By 1989, the two groups were jointly 
led by Rochus “Robbie” Vogt, a gifted experimental physicist who had until recently been the 
Provost of Caltech. The Caltech group had also made good progress on its 40 meter long 
prototype interferometer, achieving encouraging (if not yet quite sufficient) displacement 
sensitivity at 1 kHz.  
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   Under Vogt’s leadership, on 1 December 1989 the combined groups submitted to the NSF a 
proposal for a pair of 4 km long interferometers at sites widely separated within the United 
States.[31] By any measure, the plan was audacious; the plan called for funds larger than for any 
project ever yet supported by the National Science Foundation. It also assumed that it would be 
possible to scale up the sensitivity far beyond any gravitational wave detector ever yet 
constructed, whether Weber-style or interferometer. Vogt was moved to start the proposal with 
an epigraph quoting Machiavelli’s The Prince, “There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, 
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the 
introduction of a new order of things.” 
   And yet, for all of its aggressive optimism, the interferometers that were proposed to be 
constructed were not “sufficiently advanced technology” to have any assurance of success. In 
fact, the design sensitivity would fall about one order of magnitude short (in units of strain 
amplitude or of distance to be searched) of what would be required to be assured of finding 
neutron star binary signals.  
   What had happened? The team had convinced itself that it was going to be hard enough to 
achieve even these scaled back goals, and that they didn’t have a plan to achieve the more 
aggressive design that had been imagined in 1983. A couple of examples: 
• Laser power was projected to be 5 W (not 100 W), still a large scale-up from what had 
been used in the laboratory prototype interferometers.  
• Seismic isolation goals were also scaled way back; LIGO would use a simple multi-stage 
passive vibration isolation system, not the active system envisaged in the Blue Book.  
Even thus scaled back, the project would not only be an enormous undertaking, it would 
represent a truly dramatic improvement in gravitational wave sensitivity – about three orders of 
magnitude (in strain units) beyond the best previous observations (those of the most recent 
generation of cryogenic resonant detectors.) 
   Still, given what was known about sources of gravitational waves, how could this scale-back in 
design sensitivity be justified? The answer was twofold: a) by appealing to what wasn’t known 
about sources of gravitational waves, and b) by making clear that the proposed instruments ought 
to be succeeded by more advanced instruments that would (it was hoped) make up the gap in 
sensitivity between the first generation’s “best feasible” sensitivity and what would be 
“sufficiently advanced” to be guaranteed to succeed. 
   The clearest explanation of this strategy was given on pages 8 – 10 of the 1989 construction 
proposal, in a section called “Estimates of the Strengths of the Waves at Earth and Comparison 
With Anticipated LIGO Sensitivities.” Figure II-2 of the proposal (shown in the figure below) is 
an information-rich combination of projected instrument sensitivities versus frequency, 
combined with projected strengths of various sources. (This is a descendent of the graphs that the 
participants at the Battelle Workshop had been so proud to have constructed for the first time.) 
On it are shown three levels of instrument performance: a) a curve labelled “Prototype” showing 
the best performance of the Caltech 40-m interferometer, b) a second one labelled “LIGO Early 
Detector”, showing the expected performance of the instrument proposed for construction in the  
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current proposal, and c) a curve labelled “LIGO Advanced Detector” showing something like the 
Blue Book’s most optimistic curve, substantially better at all frequencies than the detector that 
was about to be built. (It was close to an order of magnitude more sensitive from 100 Hz 
upwards, and had good sensitivity down to frequencies about an order of magnitude lower.) 
 
Figure 1: A reproduction of Figure II-2 from the 1989 LIGO construction proposal. 
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   In the text accompanying this figure, it is explained that the Early Detector is what is being 
proposed in this proposal. It goes on to say, “Once the early detector has been operated near the 
sensitivity of the middle curve, a succession of ever-improving detectors will evolve, [emphasis 
mine] continually pushing the sensitivity level down (to smaller h) and left (to lower frequencies, 
f). As a rough indication of where this might lead after a few years, we show … the sensitivity of 
an ‘advanced detector’”.  
   Completing the discussion of the science case, the section then comments on the relationship 
between these sensitivity curves and the strengths of signals from different sources. Using words 
carefully, it states that “the first detector in the LIGO will have significant possibilities for 
detecting waves [emphasis in original].” It goes on to mention four possibly detectable signals, 
among them:  
• “Supernova 1987A if that burst carried ~10-4 solar masses of energy or more” (today 
considered an optimistic efficiency,) and 
• “the coalescence of a neutron-star binary out to 30 Mpc distance”  
This latter was a factor of 5 or so below what was thought needed to guarantee success, but note 
that GW170817 was detected on 17 August 2017 at a distance of 40 Mpc. 
   The section goes on to say that “If waves are not detected by the LIGO’s first detector, they 
will probably be detected by a subsequent detector with sensitivity somewhere between the 
“early detector” and “advanced detectors” sensitivities of Figure II-2.” [emphasis in original] 
There follows a list of five possible signals, among them: 
• “a supernova in the Virgo cluster that puts out 10-2 solar masses at 1 kHz and less” 
(choosing a distance that would include frequent enough signals, but still assuming much 
too high a gravitational wave emission efficiency according to today’s best estimates), 
• “a neutron-star coalescence out to almost 1 gigaparsec” (this is, finally, beyond what 
would be needed), and 
• “It could detect the coalescence of equal-mass binary black holes throughout the 
observable universe, so long as the hole masses are between 10 and 1000 times the mass 
of the Sun.” (With the benefit of hindsight, this was the most exciting prediction of all.) 
   Looking back now, it is truly remarkable that a proposal so honest about its slender prospects 
was approved! Evidently, the excitement of a potential gravitational wave discovery was strong 
enough to overcome the meager chances of near-term success. One can only applaud the courage 
of everyone involved (the proposers, the reviewers, and the funders.) 
   But we need to be clear that this meant a very long timescale before success could be expected. 
The LIGO proposal was approved by the NSF in 1990, and received its first funds from the U.S. 
Congress in 1991. It wasn’t until 2002 that the first preliminary observation run took place, with 
design sensitivity (of the “initial” version of LIGO) being reached in 2005. Only after the five 
year period of design sensitivity (and better) observations were carried out could the 
observatories be made available for the successor instrument, which by then had come to be 
called Advanced LIGO. 
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   In spite of this author’s focus on developments in the United States, it is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that the field was developing in parallel in Europe as well. In 1989, two other 
interferometer construction proposals were submitted: the German-British GEO proposal and the 
French-Italian Virgo proposal. Each was to have 3 km arms. Many details differed, with much of 
today’s best technology (for example, in lasers and in vibration isolation) prefigured in these 
proposals. The two proposals in Europe met different fates: 
• In spite of its merits, the GEO proposal couldn’t be funded once Germany re-unified, 
calling for a re-orientation of national budgets toward national reconstruction and 
integration. Instead, the GEO team found funds to build a 600 meter interferometer. 
Besides conducting observations, GEO600 became the premier site for development of 
several advanced technologies, for example squeezed light.  
• The Virgo proposal was funded. Virgo progressed on close to the same timescale as 
LIGO, observed alongside LIGO during the “initial detector era”, and participated 
(among other things) in the discovery of the neutron star binary signal GW170817. 
Each of the two European teams also forged excellent working relationships with LIGO, each in 
its own way. 
 
The road to the advanced detectors 
   In 1994, leadership of the LIGO Project passed from Robbie Vogt to Barry Barish, a very 
experienced leader in high energy physics. Barish led major re-organizations of all aspects of the 
LIGO Project. By 1997, he carried out his most far-reaching re-organization with the creation of 
the LIGO Scientific Collaboration, a body of university-based scientists around the U.S. (and 
eventually many other countries as well), who were to “carry out the scientific program of 
LIGO.”[32] The LSC included what had now been constituted as the LIGO Laboratory (the 
group of scientists and engineers at Caltech, MIT, and the two LIGO sites who were responsible 
for the interferometers themselves,) but was open to all other scientists interested in making a 
commitment to LIGO's science and technology. 
   The NSF, under Isaacson’s continued guidance, had already been funding a number of 
independent research groups who were doing LIGO-related research without any formal 
connection to the LIGO Project itself. Barish and his team initially coordinated with that group 
of scientists via informal channels, leading up to a short-lived coordinating body called the LIGO 
Research Community. But NSF needed to better demonstrate how the scientific benefits of LIGO 
would accrue to a broad community beyond the two elite institutions who were managing the 
project. In July 1996, Isaacson brought together a blue-ribbon panel to consider the Use of the 
Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory. Barish consulted with panel chair Boyce 
McDaniel (a longtime colleague from high energy physics), and the two delivered the solution 
that has served the community very well up until the present moment.[33] Rai Weiss was 
appointed to serve as the first Spokesperson of the LSC. 
   The work of the LIGO Scientific Collaboration focused on two main areas: 
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• carrying out the analysis of data in the search for signals, and 
• developing technology for detectors more advanced than the initial LIGO 
interferometers. 
   With no disrespect intended (at all!) to the data analysis work, here I’ll focus on the work 
directed toward advanced detector technology. It was this effort that enabled the LIGO team 
(Lab plus LSC) to make good on the promise that the LIGO instruments would eventually be 
able to operate at sensitivity levels that would guarantee a detection. 
   The LSC held its first meeting in August 1997 at Louisiana State University. Among its first 
tasks was to see if it was possible to create a credible design for an interferometer that would 
meet the 1989 proposal’s standards for an “advanced” detector. Fortunately, in the intervening 
years there had been a great deal of technological progress. Within two years, the LSC had 
produced a “White Paper on Detector Research and Development”,[34] containing a “reference 
design” that would, on paper at least, meet the need.  
   It was not universally agreed whether the advanced detector would gradually be approached 
through a series of partial upgrades of individual subsystems (as suggested in the 1989 
construction proposal) or whether all improvements should be brought together at once in a 
complete replacement of the original interferometers. The broader physics community had a 
major influence on this decision, through the deliberations of the Committee on Gravitational 
Physics. This body, chaired by Jim Hartle, was established to contribute a gravitational physics 
section to the Decadal Survey for Physics being assembled toward the end of the 1990’s by the 
National Academy of Sciences. The CGP devoted a not inconsiderable amount of its attention to 
LIGO. The report [35] was dramatically supportive of LIGO. In its list of “opportunities for the 
next decade”, the first three items were things that would come from successful LIGO 
observations: 
• “The first direct detection of gravitational waves by the worldwide network of 
gravitational wave detectors now under construction. 
• The first direct observation of black holes by the characteristic gravitational radiation that 
they emit in the last stages of their formation. 
• The use of gravitational waves to probe the universe of complex astronomical phenomena 
by the decoding of the details of the gravitational wave signals from particular sources.” 
   In the list of “goals”, the first two items listed were also focused on gravitational wave 
detection: 
• “Receive gravitational waves and use them to study regions of strong gravity.” 
• “Explore the extreme conditions near the surface of black holes.” 
   Finally, under “Recommendations”, the first to be listed were Gravitational Waves, where, 
under the subheading of “The High-Frequency Gravitational Wave Window”, were these three 
specific recommendations: 
• “Carry out the first phase of LIGO scientific operations. 
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• Enhance the capability of LIGO beyond the first phase of operations, with the goal of 
detecting the coalescence of neutron star binaries. 
• Support technology development that will provide the foundation for future 
improvements in LIGO’s sensitivity.” 
And in the text supporting those recommendations, the report states that the CGP “recommends 
support for sustained [emphasis in original] development of the technology necessary to upgrade 
LIGO to a sensitivity necessary to detect neutron star binary coalescences.” 
   No one could have asked for stronger support from the community! There was also extremely 
helpful guidance from the CGP that was conveyed informally to me during a dinner meeting of 
the committee. (I was privileged to serve as a member of the CGP.) Clearly, LIGO’s success was 
a matter of great concern to the Committee’s members. But so too was LIGO’s large budget. 
Members made it clear that the community could only support one large upgrade, and it would 
have to succeed as soon as possible. No one on that panel liked the idea of a long program of 
incremental improvements. They urged strongly that the LIGO team ought to make one complete 
well-planned upgrade that would enable the achievement of “sufficiently advanced technology” 
as soon as could be done. 
   By the time that the 1999 White Paper on Detector Research and Development was written, the 
private guidance from the CGP had been adopted as LIGO’s plan. (Fortunately, that guidance fit 
well with the opinions of many technical experts within LIGO about how much easier it would 
be to implement a broad set of changes all at once, as opposed to sequentially.) The White Paper 
presented a vision (called a “reference design” for what was then called “LIGO II”) for a single 
replacement for the initial LIGO instruments, not a series of adiabatic improvements aimed to 
reach a new goal asymptotically. The proposed improvement is ambitious, roughly a factor of 
twenty more sensitive in range.  
   Several things stand out about this new vision. Firstly, even though it was ambitious, it was 
realistic (at least by the standards of this ambitious field of science.) The decade that had elapsed 
since the 1989 construction proposal had indeed seen great progress. A large step upward in laser 
power (180 W in the reference design, compared with 10 W for initial LIGO) seemed within 
reach. A dramatic improvement in pendulum thermal noise was envisioned, from the use of 
fused silica instead of steel for the pendulum fibers; a technical breakthrough in realizing this 
long-desired design had come from glass-joining technology developed for the Gravity Probe B 
satellite.[36] Test mass thermal noise was also slated for a big reduction; sapphire test masses 
were suggested, but there was explicit mention of fused silica as a fallback, with knowledge by 
then of how well fused silica could perform if the correct design and construction choices were 
made. And there were plans for much better seismic isolation for reduction of noise at the lowest 
frequencies, with mention of two competing visions for how that could be achieved. 
   Equally striking, and more relevant to the point of this essay, was how explicit the White Paper 
was in its emphasis on signals from compact binary system as the justification for the design. In 
the section called “Physics Reach”, just after the “Summary and Introduction”, the first five 
possible signals mentioned are all variations on compact binary coalescences. The performance 
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projected is indeed impressive – ranges out to redshifts z of a few tenths! The authors refrained 
from stating explicitly that this is what would make all the difference between the “crap shoot” 
that was initial LIGO and the “sure thing” that was being promised here; instead of a statement 
of how large a range was required, there was a reference to an essay by Thorne reviewing the 
expected abundances of sources. Likely this was out of some residual hope that initial LIGO 
would come through after all – this was 1999, still years before the first LIGO science run and 
even more before initial LIGO reached its design sensitivity. But for anyone informed of the 
situation, including LIGO’s anxious friends in the larger gravitational physics community, the 
envisioned LIGO II would be a godsend.  
   (Notable also is the complete absence of the word “supernova” from the list of possible 
sources. This is a bit misleading, though, since the source mentioned right after the list of five 
versions of compact binary signals is “r-mode oscillations of a newborn neutron star”, at the time 
the most respectable idea for a strong gravitational wave signal from supernova core collapse.) 
   Most remarkably of all, this White Paper redeemed the nearly-incredible strategy of the 1989 
LIGO construction proposal (and of its siblings in Europe), which justified a scientifically 
inadequate design by giving a promise that we’d figure out how to do better in time to propose 
an adequate successor instrument later on.  
   The 1999 LSC White Paper served as the prospectus for further research in the U.S., allowing 
the LIGO Laboratory to submit a proposal in 2003 for the construction of Advanced LIGO. Note 
that this was still two years before initial LIGO had achieved its full design sensitivity! But given 
the community’s strong support as well as the long lead time it takes for projects of this scale, 
the aggressive timing of this proposal was sensible. (A revised proposal was submitted in 2005; 
it was approved by the National Science Board in 2008, after initial LIGO had achieved its 
design sensitivity and had carried out a long observing run.) 
 
Conclusion 
   Looking back from the current vantage point, it looks even wiser to have pushed so early and 
so aggressively for what became Advanced LIGO. It took until late 2010 for the start of 
installation of Advanced LIGO in place of the initial LIGO interferometers, and until 14 
September 2015 for the first detection of a binary black hole coalescence signal during aLIGO’s 
first observing run. After decades of “irrational exuberance”,[37] during which the search for 
gravitational wave signals was conducted with detectors whose sensitivity was far below what 
was actually believed to be required, success came when instruments known to be (close to) 
adequate finally came on line. And yet, it is surely not my intention to criticize the field for 
having persevered without any realistic near-term hope of success. After all, it is hard to 
conceive of any path that would have led to the current success of the LIGO and Virgo 
interferometers other than the one that was followed. We should have feelings of gratitude for 
the steadfastness of those in the field and those who funded the work throughout the decades that 
were required to develop sufficiently advanced technology.  
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